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JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

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TAGS: PARM PREL CWC

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 26
MAY 2006

Classified By: Elizabeth Sanders, Alternate Permanent Representative for
reasons 1.4 (B, D).

This is CWC-44-06.

¶1. (U) The week ending 26 May 2006 was relatively slow, so
this week the wrap-up will bring together a few subjects that
have yet to be reported to Washington: Japan views on CW
destruction in China, anti-terrorism, and Article X.

Japan/China O/A CW Destruction

¶2. (S//NF) During a 15 March 2006 lunch on the margins of the
EC, delrep met with the head of the OPCW Inspectorate (who
also is a senior Japanese military officer) to discuss
Japan's plans for destroying the CW munitions it abandoned in
China between after the end of its World War II occupation.
The CW destruction effort will be centered in Harbaling,
Manchuria, where some 300,000 abandoned CW (ACW) munitions
have been found. There are some 15 other sites around China
and Manchuria that also have small amounts of ACW as well.

¶3. (S//NF) Japan has proposed what it considers to be a
cost-efficient destruction effort that would allow Japan to
maintain control while preventing the Chinese from acquiring
restricted destruction technology and an open-ended source of
funding for the PLA. A joint Japan-China Committee at the
Deputy Foreign Minister level would establish destruction
program parameters and oversee the destruction effort.

¶4. (S//NF) Japan and China have yet to agree on their
appropriate functions during the CW destruction effort.
China wants a Japanese head to underscore Japan's financial
and moral responsibility, but China also wants Japanese
funding and technology to go to the PLA to carry out the
destruction. Generally, the Japanese MFA has supported a
larger Chinese role. The Japanese Defense Agency largely
supports the heavier Japanese role. The issue has been
briefed at the cabinet level but remains unresolved.

¶15. (U) A meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism was held on May 11, 2006. The meeting focused on reviewing the Note by the Director General on the OPCW's Contribution to Global Anti-Terrorism Efforts (EC-44DG.8). The OPCW's new Director of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) Krysztof Paturej began the meeting by describing DG's note as a simple historical review of the TS' anti-terrorism efforts. He noted that full implementation of the CWC and achieving universality were the two most important contributions that the TS could make in the war on terrorism. Paturej went to great lengths to downplay the number of contacts that the OPCW has had with other international organizations, apparently in order to allay the Iran's concerns. Paturej stated that the TS does talk with other organizations that contact the TS to discuss possible synergies in the anti-terrorism field. He characterized most of the contacts as information sharing and not operational in nature.

¶16. (U) India said that it believed that the OPCW was best suited to discuss anti-terrorism at a policy level as opposed to working on counterterrorism at an operational level. India then suggested that increased efforts within the sphere of Article X assistance also would make a positive contribution to anti-terrorism. Norway countered that it supported the TS exploring & operational⁸ ways that the TS could play a greater role in anti-terrorism efforts. The Netherlands cautioned that delegations should be cautious about how they use the term & operational⁸, making it clear, for example, that & operational⁸ would not include intelligence sharing. The facilitator, Moal-Makame (France), suggested that the term & practical efforts⁸ would be better than the term & operational⁸. Spain strongly supported TS

anti-terrorism efforts and urged delegations to give the TS the latitude it needs to determine with which and what types of contacts would be best for the organization.

¶17. (U) Iran said there was a great need to review the TS' efforts in anti-terrorism. Iran questioned the utility of the contacts the TS has had with other international and regional organizations to date and observed that some of the organizations with which the TS has had contacts (read NATO) are involved in intelligence gathering and sharing. Italy suggested that a greater emphasis should be put on universality. The Italian delegate muddied the waters a bit by suggesting that greater efforts should be made to operationalise the TS' anti-terrorism efforts. China said it was broadly supportive of the TS' anti-terrorism efforts provided it would not require additional financial resources from the budget. China also suggested that the organization's anti-terrorism efforts and the direction it should take would be a good topic for discussion at the second Review Conference. The facilitator noted that she was not sure this would be an appropriate topic.

¶18. (U) Iran requested that the Office of Special Projects provide delegates with a plan of work for the next six months so that delegations can judge the necessity of contacts with outside organizations. Paturej responded that he was acutely aware of his mandate and would not exceed it. He said he was not aggressively seeking large numbers of contacts with outside organizations but at the same time, if an international or regional organization contacted him to discuss anti-terrorism efforts, he would not refuse to discuss the issue or possible areas for cooperation. Iran then asked that Paturej at least inform delegations which organizations contact him. Norway supported TS contacts with outside organizations. Germany strongly supported Paturej's contacts with outside organizations and said it did not believe that the TS had at any point transgressed its mandate in talking with other organizations about anti-terrorism efforts. Germany said that whether or not States Parties like NATO should not be the issue. What is more important was the relevance of the organization to the global anti-terrorism efforts. Germany and Austria also supported

an increased linkage between Article X assistance and protection efforts with anti-terrorism efforts.

¶19. (U) Moal-Makame suggested that delegations examine the UN SYG note on anti-terrorism efforts (A-60-825) and note the SYG's references to possible terrorist chemical attacks and the OPCW. She highlighted the fact that paragraph 89 of the note urges increased security for industrial chemical facilities to protect them from terrorist attack.

¶10. (U) At the end of the meeting Paturej informed delegations that he had recently had a positive meeting with the EU Anti-Terrorism Coordinator Mr. DeVries. Paturej said they discussed both EU and OPCW anti-terrorism efforts. DeVries said he would be willing to attend the next OEWG meeting and discuss the EU's efforts in this area.

¶11. (U) In the end little came out of the meeting. Iran and India made it clear that they were concerned about TS work in this field, in particular its cooperation with NATO. Most other delegations were supportive of the TS continuing to play the ill-defined role that it plays in anti-terrorism. It is clear that there is political support for the TS to play some kind of role in anti-terrorism but at the same time there is nothing approaching consensus on what exactly that role should be.

Article X

¶12. (U) Consultations on Article X were held on May 12, 2006. The focus of the consultation was the Joint Assistance II exercise held in the Ukraine from October 9 - 13, 2005. Only about 12 delegations, primarily from NATO countries, attended the meeting (due to a last minute NAM meeting scheduled at the same time). In addition to the facilitator, Hans Schramml (Austria), TS officials Faiza Patel-King (VER/PRB) and Renato Carvalho (INS/IMB) attended. Captain Francois from the French Army also took part, giving the perspective of a participating SP.

¶13. (U) Patel-King, who drafted the TS report on the exercise, began the meeting by noting the importance of the exercise for the OPCW. She said it was the largest exercise in which the OPCW had participated as well as the first that included consequence management. There were seven States Parties that took part, approximately 170 personnel from those seven countries. The TS deployed 29 inspectors, 25 of who focused on Investigations of Alleged Use (IAU), and four who worked on assistance. In addition, there were two US and two UK evaluators. On the whole the OPCW was able to carry out the task assigned to it, though Patel-King conceded that this was largely due to the fact that the OPCW team had received specialized training in advance of the exercise. Targeted training played a key role.

¶14. (U) In evaluating the exercise afterwards, the TS concluded that in the future it would be critical to develop a core team to coordinate the activities of the TS in any IAU or challenge inspection (CI). The TS should also consider increasing the number of individuals focusing on assistance even if only to gather information in case assistance is later requested. Long range planning that addresses potential IAUs and CIs needs to be incorporated into the TS training program. The database of experts available for assistance needs to be significantly improved and updated. Radio equipment adequate for longer ranges that works around the world should be purchased. Reconnaissance equipment also needs to be upgraded. A capacity for biomedical sampling needs to be developed. Information sharing within the TS and externally with other actors needs to be improved. The OPCW's media outreach plans need to be reviewed and improved. Simply saying &no comment will not work in the real world. Formal reporting back to HQ needs to be improved and more work needs to be done in developing possible future for scenarios for exercises and real world

contingencies.

¶15. (U) Carvalho told delegations that after the TS completed its evaluation, the DG asked that a working group be formed and a follow up plan be developed to address the issues raised in the evaluation report. The working group developed the plan and then is to make sure the plan's 50 recommendations were implemented. Almost all of the recommendations have been implemented but there are still a few problems to be addressed. They include revising all of the SOP's related to IAU's and CIs (60% completed to date), increased funding for training needed, and addressing the shortage of Inspectorate personnel in place to do inspections and at the same time receive training, continued work on scenario development.

¶16. (U) Captain Francois from the French Army then gave his presentation on Joint Assistance II. The French had a 37-person reconnaissance module take part in the exercise. He noted several areas for improvement in future exercises or real world operations of this type. They included the need to standardize procedures whenever possible, the need to work in a common language or at the very least have participants bring interpreters if a common language is not possible, the need to identify and involve local officials who have decision-making authority, and the need to have available and respected safety guidance whenever possible. Despite the identification of all these areas for improvement, Captain Francois said he still found the exercise beneficial. In closing Francois said that there are two difficult questions that delegates should think about: Is the OPCW ready to assume a coordinating role for such a situation (exercise or not)? If an SP has difficulty in managing a & situation8 on their territory, which actor will take charge?

¶17. (U) The Italian delegation asked if the OPCW was capable of leading the coordination of such a large-scale exercise or situation. Would the TS have to work with a larger regional or international organization? Patel-King responded that Joint Assistance constituted a large commitment of resources and personnel for the TS but was beneficial to the organization. She said that the scale of future exercises or incidents as well as the scenario would determine the ability of the TS to play a leading role, noting for example that the TS only has 1000 protective suits in its inventory and hopes

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to increase that to 2000 in the near future. She also said it was clear that the TS had much work to do in the area of assistance. Patel-King also announced that there would be a final follow up meeting in Kiev from October 16-20 to evaluate the exercise.

¶18. (U) The UK supported the idea of improving the assistance database and urged the TS to continue to conduct small-scale exercises including tabletop exercises. In cases of IAU, the UK supported the French suggestion of having specialized interpreters available. The UK supported continued work in biomedical testing. Patel-King replied that the biomedical issue was before the policy making organs now and that the TS was working on developing some smaller scale exercises in the future.

¶19. (U) SANDERS SENDS.
ARNALL